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Article 5

Personal Jurisdiction Issues
and the Internet
Stephanie A. Waxler

I. Introduction
The use of the Internet has caused an explosion in
the amount of interstate and international commerce. A
consumer in Alaska can purchase an item from a supplier
in Taiwan by merely clicking a button. Though the
Internet seemingly makes life easier for consumers, it
creates jurisdictional problems for the courts. Personal
jurisdiction becomes an issue in such cases due to the
different, and perhaps unknown, location of the parties.
In such cases, the courts must implement an approach to
determine what is the fair and equitable forum for the
parties to litigate.
This Note will review the traditional requirements
for personal jurisdiction, describe today's Internet system, analyze the methods of finding personal jurisdiction
over a party, and discuss holdings of the courts in such
cases.

II. Traditional Personal Jurisdiction
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment limits the power of a state court to render a valid
judgment against a non-resident defendant.' A judgment
obtained in violation of due process is invalid and not
given the full faith and credit of other states.' In order to
satisfy the due process requirement, a defendant must
receive proper notice of the lawsuit and be subject to
personal jurisdiction in the forum state.' Whether due
process is satisfied depends "upon the quality and nature
of the activity in relation to the fair and orderly adminis-
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tration of the laws which it was the purpose of the due
4
process clause to insure."
Historically, the court's jurisdiction to render
judgment in personani was grounded in their de facto
power over the defendant's person, and the defendant's
physical presence within the territorial jurisdiction of the
court was a prerequisite to its rendition of a binding
judgment upon the defendant.' Today, due process provides that a non-resident defendant may be subject to
jurisdiction if certain minimum contacts with the forum
exist such that the maintenance of the suit does not
offend the traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice.6
The rationale behind this is two-fold: it protects
the defendant from the burden of litigating in a distant or
inconvenient forum, and insures that states do not reach
beyond the limits imposed on them by their status as coequal sovereigns in a federal system.7 Further, the due
process clause "gives a degree of predictability to the
legal system that allows potential defendants to structure
their primary conduct with some minimum assurance as
to where that conduct will and will not render them
liable to suit."'8 When determining whether a forum may
constitutionally assert jurisdiction over a non-resident
defendant, the courts focus on the fairness and reasonableness of exercising such jurisdiction over the
defendant.9 Jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant
exists in two forms, general or specific jurisdiction. 10
A. General Jurisdiction
General personal jurisdiction exists over a defendant when he has sufficient contacts with the forum
state." The defendant's contacts have to be substantial or
continuous and systematic to meet this "sufficiency"
requirement. In InternationalShoe Co. v. State of Washington, the court found personal jurisdiction over International Shoe because of its continuous and systematic
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contacts with the State of Washington. 12 The court noted
that International Shoe's contacts with Washington resulted in a large volume of interstate business during the
course of which International Shoe received the benefits
and protection of the laws of the state. 3 These activities
established sufficient contacts with Washington "to make
it reasonable and just according to our traditional conception of fair play and substantial justice to permit the state
to enforce the obligations which International Shoe has
14
incurred there.'
B. Specific Jurisdiction
Alternatively, when a forum seeks to assert specific jurisdiction over an out of state defendant, the "fair
warning" requirement is satisfied if the defendant has
purposefully directed his activities to the residents of the
forum and the litigation results from injuries that arise
out of, or relate to, that activity.'5 In such situations,
jurisdiction cannot be avoided merely because the defendant did not physically enter the forum. 6 For example, if
a defendant delivers its products into the stream of
commerce of the forum state, with the expectation that
the products will be purchased by consumers in the
forum state, and these products injure forum consumers,
17
the defendant is subject to specific personal jurisdiction.
With both general and specific personal jurisdiction, a defendant must also meet the "purposeful
availment" requirement. 8 This requirement insures that a
defendant will not be haled into court as a result of
"'random', 'fortuitous' or 'attenuated' contacts, or of the
unilateral activity of another party or a third person."' 9
Yet foreseeability alone is not a "sufficient benchmark"
for a state to exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant. 20 Critical to the due process analysis
is whether the defendant will foresee that his conduct
and connections with the forum state are such that he
should reasonably anticipate being haled into court
there.2 '
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Volume 13, Number 2 2001

In addition to meeting the requirements of general
or specific personal jurisdiction mentioned above, the
courts also consider other factors to insure that maintenance of the suit would not offend the traditional notions
of fair play and substantial justice. 22 Such factors include:
the burden on the defendant; the forum state's interest in
the litigation; the plaintiff's interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief; the interstate judicial system's
interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of
controversies; and the shared interests of the several
states in furthering fundamental substantive social
policies. 23 The incorporation of these factors helps insure
that a state does not make a binding judgment against a
defendant with which the state has no contacts, ties or
relation.24

III. The Internet and Personal Jurisdiction
A. The Internet
The Internet is the world's largest network of
computers linked together for the purpose of sharing
electronic mail and files. 2 The Internet contains thousands of independent networks, encapsulating millions
of "host" computers which provide information services
to the world.26 A "site" is an address on the Internet
which permits users to share or exchange information
with a specific host. 27 The collection of sites available on
'2
the Internet is referred to as the "world-wide web."
In establishing personal jurisdiction over nonresident Internet sites, courts have adopted two different
approaches. These two approaches are referred to as the
sliding scale test and the effects doctrine.
1. Sliding Scale Test
Under the sliding scale test, Internet websites are
placed in one of three categories: 1) passive websites;
Volume 13, Number 2 2001
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2) websites where the user can exchange information
with the host computer (interactive websites); and
3) websites where the owner actively does business over
the Internet.29 Courts have held that simply registering a
domain name for a website is not enough to create personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant without
"something else."3° Passive websites are just that - sites
that merely provide information or advertisements to
users. 31 In these situations, there is no personal jurisdiction over foreign defendants because courts do not want
to exercise jurisdiction over everyone who establishes an
Internet website.32 PheasantRun, Inc. v. Moyse and
Bensusan RestaurantCorp. v. King, are two cases in which
the courts found no personal jurisdiction over defendants
who operated a passive website.33
In Pheasant Run, Inc. v. Moyse, the plaintiff filed an
action asserting trademark and trade name infringement
of the name "Pheasant Run." 3 The plaintiff corporation
owned and operated a country club in Illinois, in addition to having "exclusive ownership of the mark for use
in connection with golf courses, resort hotels, lodge,
convention center, and restaurant services." 35 Defendants
operated a restaurant in Ohio called the "Pheasant Run
Inn" and maintained a website incorporating the name,
which the plaintiff claims subjects the defendants to suit
in Illinois.36
In its analysis of the sliding scale test, the court
found that because the defendants' website was a passive
website, they were not subject to personal jurisdiction in
Illinois. 37 The court based this decision on the fact that
while the website contained the defendants' telephone
number, it did not enable Internet users to communicate
directly with the defendants. 8 Additionally, there was no
evidence that the defendants advertised over the
Internet, consented to ads being posted in Illinois, or
even knew that such ads were posted in Illinois.39 Defendants' further contended that they never advertised
anywhere outside of Ohio, and never authorized, or were
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aware of, any agents or employees to advertise on their
behalf. 40Since there was no evidence to indicate that the
defendants purposefully directed their activities to Illinois, the court refused to exercise personal jurisdiction
41
over the defendants in Illinois.
The court in Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King,
reached the same conclusion when it held that a passive
website is insufficient to obtain personal jurisdiction in
New York over a Missouri defendant. 42 InBensusan, the
plaintiff was a New York corporation that operated clubs
worldwide and owned the rights, title, and interest in
and to the registered trademark "The Blue Note." 43 The
defendant owned a small club in Missouri called "The
Blue Note," and maintained a website, located on a
Missouri server, which included a logo similar to
Bensusan's registered trademark. 44 The defendant's site
was a general access website, which means that it was
accessible to anyone who had Internet access. 45 The site
contained general information about the Missouri club - a
calendar of events and ticket information, including the
names and addresses of the local ticket outlets and a
charge-by-phone telephone number.46 Also, the site contained a disclaimer that it should not be confused with
47
The Blue Note in New York.
The difference between this case and PheasantRun
is that here, there was an "offer" to sell an infringing
product (the defendant's Blue Note tickets) in New
York. 4 In refusing to find personal jurisdiction in New
York, the court stated that the infringement, if any, would
have occurred in Missouri and not in New York. 49 A New
York resident would have to access the site, call Missouri
to reserve tickets, and go to Missouri to pick up the tickets
because the defendant did not mail out tickets50 There
was no evidence that the defendant encouraged New
York residents to access his site, that he conducted any
business in New York, or that he received substantial
revenue from interstate commerce.' The court concluded
that "[t]he mere fact that a person can gain information
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on the allegedly infringing product is not the equivalent
of a person advertising, promoting, selling or otherwise
making an effort to target its products in New York." 2
Therefore there was no personal jurisdiction over the
defendant in New York. 3
An interactive website enables a user to exchange
information with the host computer.54 Personal jurisdiction over interactive website owners is determined by
examining the degree of interactivity and commercial
nature of the information exchanged.5 LFG, LLC v. Zapata
Corp. and Conseco, Inc. v. Hickerson both address jurisdiction over interactive websites, yet the courts differ in
56
their findings of personal jurisdiction.
In LFG, LLC v. Zapata Corp., the Illinois district
court found personal jurisdiction over a non-resident
defendant operating an interactive website.57 The plaintiff
was an Illinois business that provided on-line trading,
stocks, commodity futures and option research, and
financial news, and had a trademark registration of
"ZAP."5 The defendant, a Delaware corporation with its
principal place of business in Texas, developed a website
structured as a "portal," through which it offered a list of
connections to other sites by way of hyperlinks. 59 The
defendant's site linked users to these related sites at no
charge. 60Furthermore, users could sign up for the
defendant's mailing list.61 Additionally, the defendant
entered into a non-binding letter of intent with an Illinois
company for the purpose of acquiring the sites linked to
its site. 62 The plaintiff contended that the defendant's
website would cause confusion with its own website
because the names "ZAP" and "ZAPATA" were so similar.63
In deciding the issue of personal jurisdiction, the
court found that the defendant's website was interactive
because it contained a contact page where a user could
send e-mail to the defendant in addition to joining its
mailing list.6 The court next looked at the level of
interactivity of the information exchanged over the site.6
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It found that twenty-five Illinois residents were on the
defendant's mailing list and that the defendant created
the site for the purpose of developing contacts with
Internet users, and that this act illustrated the
defendant's choice to enter and establish contact with
Illinois. 66 The court also examined the defendant's nonInternet contacts with Illinois, and found that by entering
into a letter of intent with an Illinois company, it purposefully reached out to an Illinois company in order to
enhance its reputation among Illinois Internet users.6 7
The court concluded that the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the defendant was proper because its activity caused injury to Illinois residents. 68
The court in Conseco, Inc. v. Hickerson, came to a
different conclusion and found no personal jurisdiction
in Indiana over a foreign defendant operating an interactive website. 69 In this case, the Texas defendant used the
plaintiff's trademarked name in his website. 70 The
website sought information concerning fraud or unfair
treatment by one of the plaintiff's subsidiaries, and
contained a "mailto" link, allowing the user to send email directly to the defendant.71
In determining whether the defendant's website
was interactive, the court noted that the site's "mailto"
link and thus satisfied the level of activity required for an
interactive website. 72 The court, however, did not find
that the defendant's site possessed enough interactivity
to give Indiana personal jurisdiction. 73 The defendant's
only contact with Indiana was his discussion of the
plaintiff on his website. 74 He did not direct any advertising, send any mail, or make any phone calls to Indiana,
and did not purposefully avail himself of the benefits or
protections of Indiana law.75 Because the defendant's
contacts were not enough to satisfy the minimum contacts requirement, personal jurisdiction over the defendant in Indiana was improper.76
In the third category of the sliding scale test, when
a defendant enters into a contract with residents of a
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foreign jurisdiction over the Internet that involves knowing and repeated transmission of computer files over the
Internet, personal jurisdiction is properY Personal jurisdiction is proper in this situation because the defendant
has established minimum contacts with the forum, and
has purposefully and deliberately availed itself of the
protections of the forum's laws. 78
In Euromnarket Designs, Inc. v. Crate and Barrel Ltd.,
the court found that the defendant's website conducted
business over the Internet and made and maintained
contacts with Illinois.79 In this case, the defendant was an
Irish corporation that operated stores in Ireland and a
website for the purpose of selling its goods.80 Prominently
displayed on both the store and on the website, was the
defendant's name, "Crate and Barrel." 8 ' The plaintiff, an
Illinois corporation, sued the defendant, maintaining that
the defendant infringed its "Crate and Barrel"
trademark.8 2 Although the defendant was located in
Ireland, its website included goods priced in U.S. dollars,
and the billing and shipping city, state and zip code
format was unique to the United States.83 Moreover, the
site contained a menu of the United States.84
In addition to the interactive nature of the website,
the defendant had made and maintained connections
with Illinois.8 5 It had purchased goods from Illinois suppliers, participated in trade shows, promoted business in
Illinois, and placed advertisements in foreign magazines
targeted to readers in Illinois. Furthermore, an Illinois
resident placed an order and received her goods with the
sender marked as "Crate and Barrel" with a Dublin
return address.87 From the above mentioned facts, the
court concluded that the defendant purposefully availed
itself of Illinois customers and of the protections of Illinois laws, and therefore was subject to personal jurisdiction in Illinois. 8
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2.

Effects Doctrine

The effects doctrine is another way in which
courts may determine whether a foreign defendant has
established minimum contacts with the forum state to
subject him to personal jurisdiction. 89 Under the effects
doctrine, personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant is proper when his tortious actions are intentional
and directed at the forum state, and cause such harm to a
resident plaintiff as can be reasonably anticipated by the
defendant. 90
In IndianapolisColts, Inc. v. Metropolitan Baltimore
Football Club, L.P., the court applied the effects doctrine
and found personal jurisdiction in Indiana over the nonresident defendant. 91 The plaintiff contented that the
defendant infringed the plaintiff's trademark by broadcasting it over national television. 2 The court found that
the unauthorized broadcasting of the plaintiff's trademark into Indiana caused injury to the plaintiff in
Indiana. 93 Therefore, the court concluded that the exercise
of personal jurisdiction over the defendant was proper
94
under the effects doctrine.
The court in PanavisionInt'l., L.P. v. Toeppen, used
both the effects doctrine and the sliding scale test to
assert personal jurisdiction over the defendant. 95 Here, an
Illinois defendant registered a Delaware corporation's
trademark as his Internet domain name, and attempted
to force the plaintiff to pay him money to "rescind" his
domain name.96 Although simply registering another's
trademark as a website domain name was insufficient to
establish personal jurisdiction over a foreign defendant,
the court stated that the defendant's registration of the
plaintiff's trademark was done solely for the purpose of
extorting money from the plaintiff.9 The court felt that
most of the harm to the plaintiff would be felt in California because its principal place of business was located
there.98 But for the defendant's conduct, no injury would
have befallen the plaintiff, and because these claims arose
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out of the defendant's California-related activities, personal jurisdiction in California was proper. 9

IV. Impact
The decisions in the aforementioned cases are
predictable and consistent with the notions of fair play
and substantial justice underlying personal jurisdiction.
When it is clear that defendants have continuous and
systematic contacts with the forum state, such as in LFG,
LLC, EurornarketDesigns, and Panavision,the courts have
found personal jurisdiction over the defendants. Where
there are no such contacts, as in PheasantRun and
Bensusan, the courts have declined to find personal jurisdiction over the non-resident defendants. These holdings
are comparable to those which would apply to nonInternet defendants, and thus maintain a level of predictability in personal jurisdiction cases. Yet in Conseco, the
court found a way to find jurisdiction over a defendant,
even though he did not have as substantial contacts as
the defendants in LFG, LLC, Euromarket Designs, and
Panavision.The court equated the defendant's "mailto"
link to a contact sufficient enough to justify the exercise
of personal jurisdiction.
The courts want to protect the consumers in their
forum, as seen in EurornarketDesigns and LFG, LLC.
Through predictable yet malleable methods of finding
personal jurisdiction over non-resident defendants in
Internet actions, the courts have reached a balance between protecting their consumers while staying within
the bounds of the personal jurisdiction requirements.

V. Conclusion
From the above mentioned cases, it is clear that
courts want to protect their consumers from harm. The
application of the sliding scale tests and the effects doctrine, individually and in combination, give the courts a
198
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good framework with which to justify jurisdiction. Personal jurisdiction issues over the Internet are recent, and
the courts, using these approaches, are developing a fair
and predictable method of asserting personal jurisdiction
over non-resident defendants.
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